Liu Shao-Ch'i and "People's War":  A Report on the Creation of Base Areas in 1938 by Schwarz, Henry G.
Liu Shao-Ch'i and "People's War 
A Report on the Creation of 
Base Areas in 1938 
w. 
Henry G. Schwarz 
I N T E R N A T I O N A L STUDIES, E A S T A S I A N SERIES 
R E S E A R C H P U B L I C A T I O N , N U M B E R T H R E E 
C E N T E R F O R E A S T ASIAN STUDIES 
T H E UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS 
Liu Shao-Ch'i and "People's War": 
A Report on the Creation of 
Base Areas in 1938 
Henry G. Schwarz 
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, EAST ASIAN SERIES 
RESEARCH PUBLICATION, NUMBER T H R E E 
CENTER FOR EAST ASIAN STUDIES 
T H E UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS 
COPYRIGHT© 1969 
CENTER FOR EAST ASIAN STUDIES 
T H E UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS 
Library of Congress catalog card number 74-627561 
All rights reserved 
Manufactured in the United States of America 
Sole distributors in the USA & Canada 
PARAGON BOOK GALLERY, LTD. 
14 East 38th Street 
New York, N.Y. 10016 
Foreword 
This publication has two purposes. First, it presents an im-
portant document on the problems facing the Chinese Commu-
nists in creating resistance centers behind enemy lines during 
the early months of the war against Japan and the methods they 
used in dealing with those problems. The document is a report 
by Liu Shao-ch'i on the creation of Chin-Ch'a-Chi, formally the 
Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Border region, and other resistance cen-
ters behind Japanese lines. It was said to have been first pub-
lished in the Ming-jen chiangyen chi (A Collection of Lectures 
by Important Men) (Yenan: K'ang T a Political Department, 
March 20, 1939). It was reprinted in Chunghua minkuo k'aikuo 
wu-shih nien wenhsien pientsuan wTeiyiianhui, Kungfei huokuo 
shihliao huipien (A Compendium of Materials on the Betrayal 
of the Nation by the Chinese Communists) (Taipei, 1964), III , 
294-315). Although I have not seen the original, a careful check 
has satisfied me that the Nationalist reprint is probably genuine. 
Second, the publication presents an essay which attempts to place 
the document in its historical setting. 
My thanks go to Donald Klein for many helpful suggestions 
and criticisms, to my colleagues in the history department at 
Kansas who as members of the ' 'Hatchet Club" collectively dis-
sected an earlier draft, and to Miss Angela Fitzgerald and Robert 
Friesner for proofreading my manuscript. All have contributed 
importantly to this publication, but none shares my responsibil-
ity for any remaining errors. 
HENRY G. SCHWARZ 
Bellingham, Washington 
November 12, 1969 
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The Document and Its Significance 
The rise of Communism in China covered a period of almost 
thirty years. If the student of modern China attempted to deter-
mine which single event or series of events during this period 
had been the most formative for the post-1949 leadership, he 
would be faced with a difficult choice. Some scholars might still 
feel that the civil war from 1946 to 1949 largely determined the 
shape of the post-1949 leadership. This view could be based 
primarily either on an alleged American failure to help the Na-
tionalist government sufficiently (the "American loss of China' ' 
thesis) or on Chinese domestic conditions. Others might argue 
that the Communist movement was shaped in the 1920's by 
Comintern directives and by the vicissitudes of the alliance with 
the Kuomintang into a mold which has remained effective until 
the present. Still another interpretation holds that the forma-
tion of so-called Soviet bases in southern China around 1930 was 
the beginning of a distinctively indigenous form of Communism 
that has been the primary shaper of the present-day leadership 
in mainland China. Finally, there is the view that the war 
against Japan was the most decisive factor. Each of these inter-
pretations has considerable merit because each of these events 
has manifestly contributed to the nature and orientation of the 
post-1949 leadership. 
My own view is that the period of the war against Japan has 
had a greater and more lasting impact on the nature of the Chi-
nese Communist leadership and on the policies and administra-
tion of the mainland since 1949 than any other event or combin-
ation of events before 1949. During the war, the Communists 
had established several outer base areas behind Japanese lines 
(see below).1 The leaders of each base area formed small cohe-
sive groups which changed little in membership during a long 
period of time (eight years), and shared extraordinary hardships. 
The cohesiveness and the length of time, if not the degree of 
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hardship, were unprecedented in the history of Chinese Commu-
nism. They were the ingredients of clusters of friendship, trust, 
and loyalty that were to persist long after the war. 
Very little is known about the formation of outer base areas. 
The few scholarly studies touching upon Chin-Ch'a-Chi, which 
was the first outer base area formed in the winter of 1937-38, refer 
to periods either before or after its formation. Lyman Van Slyke 
in his study of the United Front, and Donald Gillin in his por-
trayal of Yen Hsi-shan, discuss to some extent the preparations 
for the coming war made by the Communists and by other anti-
Japanese political forces in Shansi in 1936 and early 1937.2 Eye-
witness accounts such as Harrison F o r m a t s and Jack Belden's 
cover a much later period—the final stages of the war and the 
post-war period. Their descriptions of the formation of Chin-
Ch'a-Chi are ex post facto accounts based on interviews with 
prominent Communist leaders.3 T o the best of my knowledge, 
the only contemporary though unofficial accounts of the early 
months of Chin-Ch'a-Chi have been by the non-Communist 
newspaper reporter, Chou Li-po, and by the American military 
observer, Evans Carlson.4 
Liu Shao-ch'i's report, as it was published by the political 
department of K'ang Ta in March, 1939 and then reprinted by 
the Nationalists, seems to be a verbatim record. It is not, there-
fore, well organized, as the reader quickly recognizes, and the 
numbering of chapters, sections, and paragraphs was so confused 
that I have taken the liberty of editing and polishing it. It is 
obvious that Liu had very little time to prepare a well-organized 
report and no time at all to edit it for publication after its oral 
presentation to the students of K'ang Ta. As shown later (see 
pp. 21-22), Liu was almost constantly on the move after the out-
break of the war. He went to Yenan several times to attend im-
portant conferences, but as soon as his business there was 
finished, he returned to the various missions he had behind 
enemy lines during the war. The hectic and hazardous nature of 
Liu's wartime activities clearly made it difficult for him to find 
time to edit this important report. Perhaps this also explains 
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why his report was not immediately published in a central organ 
such as Chiehfang (Liberation), but, after a delay of one year, in 
the Ming-jen chiangyen chi, an organ of K'ang Ta, the school 
where he presented his report. 
The document's importance can hardly be overstated. It is 
the only extant official contemporary account of the problems 
and methods of creating outer base areas. It is not a later revi-
sion, as occurs all too commonly among the Chinese Communists 
and which, as demonstrated in cases where revised texts have 
been compared with the originals, can differ significantly from 
the originals in both form and substance. Nor are later official 
statements on the problems and methods of building outer base 
areas as detailed and comprehensive as Liu's report. 
The document also raises questions about Liu Shao-chTs 
position in the early phases of the war against Japan. These ques-
tions have become crucially important during the past two years 
because the "Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution," as direct-
ed by the Mao group, has sought to destroy Liu Shao-chTs tre-
mendous influence within the Party and the government. 
We shall now turn to a brief discussion of the conditions in 
which the outer areas were created and of the man and his posi-
tion within the Chinese Communist movement. 
The Conditions 
In order better to understand the problems facing the Chi-
nese Communists in the formation of outer base areas, a few 
words must be said about political and social conditions prevail-
ing in China, particularly in North China, before the outbreak 
of the war against Japan. However, only the barest sketch of 
some of the most important characteristics of the Chinese state 
and society is possible within the scope of this essay.5 
China, on the eve of the war against Japan, remained a patch-
work of regional powers for four reasons. First, the Kuomintang, 
which had been the main force of the Northern Expedition and 
was essentially the sole political force behind the national gov-
ernment, had purchased its victory over the Peking warlord 
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coalition with political concessions to other warlords who had 
participated in the Northern Expedition.6 Second, the Northern 
Expedition never touched vast areas of China, including the en-
tire western half of the country and Manchuria. Third, the na-
tional government, once installed in Nanking, never could 
muster enough military force to cancel its political obligations 
to all regional leaders of China. Fourth, there was little popular 
identification with any government, central or regional. 
As in other traditional societies, the vast majority of the 
people lived in particularistic social contexts that were centered 
on the family and seldom went beyond the county. The national 
government (or any regional government, for that matter) was 
not part of that particularistic world and thus not "real." As 
Barnett illustrates, as late as 1948 in Szechuan, where the national 
government had resided for six years (from 1938 to 1946), com-
mon people had never heard of Mao Tse-tung, and Chiang Kai-
shek was just a name to them.7 Only students and a relatively 
few other politically conscious persons took an active interest in 
national affairs. They probably did not constitute more than 
ten per cent of the population. Moreover, many of these mem-
bers of the intellectual elite of China had become so frustrated 
by and disgusted with political disunity that they could not be 
enlisted by any of the existing governments. They disengaged 
from and participated in political affairs only sporadically and 
negatively, as in demonstrations and boycotts. 
North China, and particularly Shansi province, where much 
of the nucleus of the future Chin-Ch'a-Chi base area was located, 
was disunited for all four reasons. Yen Hsi-shan had cooperated 
with the Kuomintang during the latter stages of the Northern 
Expedition. In fact, his troops were the first to enter Peking 
where, until then, the warlord coalition had its internationally 
recognized "national" government. His own province of Shansi 
was never touched by the Kuomintang troops during the North-
ern Expedition. Chiang Kai-shek never had enough military 
strength to subject Shansi to central control until the eve of the 
war against Japan. By then, other conditions had emerged that 
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made military force ineffectual if not irrelevent in subjecting 
Shansi to central government control (see below). 
Popular attitudes toward politics and toward the various 
governments were even more sharply polarized in North China 
than in the rest of the country. North China had more politi-
cally conscious people than any other region. Two major rea-
sons accounted for this difference. 
First, the country's greatest universities and colleges were in 
Peking. The students of Peking and Tsinghua Universities and 
of dozens of other smaller schools in Peking and Tientsin fol-
lowed the example set by their predecessors who had staged the 
great May Fourth Movement in 1919 in protest against what 
they had considered the "sell-out" of China at the Versailles Con-
ference. Now, in the 1930's, the students in Peking once again 
seized the leadership of a movement. They wanted to arouse the 
national government and the people to resist further Japanese 
encroachments. They had a large and receptive audience in 
North China because of the great concentration of large urban 
centers there. In 1930 there were eighteen cities with over 
100,000 inhabitants in North China compared to thirty-two in 
the rest of the country.8 
Second, until the outbreak of the war, North China was the 
only region which was directly exposed to the Japanese threat. 
The Japanese Kuantung Army had occupied all of Manchuria 
in 1931. It established a puppet regime called Manchukuo and 
installed the last Ch'ing emperor, Aisin-Gioro P'u-i, as "chief of 
state." In subsequent years, the Japanese sought to create sev-
eral buffer regimes between Manchukuo and the rest of China. 
The Peking-Tientsin area was neutralized by agreement with 
the Kuomintang government (The Tangku Truce of May 25, 
1933), by which the latter promised to withdraw its troops from 
that area. However, the Japanese succeeded only partially in 
filling the vacuum. They tried to set up an autonomous govern-
ment for the five provinces of Hopei, Chahar, Suiyiian, Shan-
tung, and Shansi. Only the East Hopei Autonomous Council 
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under General Yin Ju-keng materialized from the Japanese ef-
forts. 
Along the northern periphery of North China, bordering on 
the Gobi desert, the Nationalist government attempted to keep 
the Mongols loyal by forming, in the spring of 1934, the Inner 
Mongolia Autonomous Political Council (Neimeng tifang tzu-
chih chengwu hui).9 This council, under the leadership of 
Prince Te, was soon infiltrated by Japanese agents who succeed-
ed in winning over Prince Te . By the winter of 1936-37, Prince 
T e entered an alliance with the puppet regime in Manchukuo. 
Mongol troops with Japanese assistance clashed with Chinese 
forces in western Suiyiian and threatened to invade Shansi. Al-
though the forces of Prince T e were pushed back to eastern Cha-
har, the threat of pro-Japanese Mongol secessionism did not 
diminish. In June of 1937, Prince T e formed an ostensibly in-
dependent regime. 
Despite the Japanese threat and mounting agitation by stu-
dents and others, areas of North China still free from Japanese 
military control remained disunited. Shansi was no exception. 
Although the national government claimed nominal control 
over Shansi province, the actual power resided in Yen Hsi-shan, 
the warlord who had ruled Shansi as his private domain since 
1911. Situated between the Japanese and their collaborators to 
north and east, the Nationalist government to the south and the 
Communist base area at Yenan to the west, Yen Hsi-shan sought 
to maintain his hold over Shansi by rigorously opposing the 
Japanese on one hand and by playing the Communists against 
the Nationalists, on the other. He was not very successful. 
Until the Japanese invasion of Shansi in September of 1937, 
Yen Hsi-shan ruled that province independently. After Septem-
ber of 1932, his grip on Shansi was no longer tight enough to 
prevent political agitation from within and military aggression 
from without. When the East Hopei Autonomous Government 
under General Yin Ju-keng was established in November of 
1935, students and others staged large protest demonstrations in 
T'aiyiian, the capital of Shansi. Many of these demonstrators 
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had come to Shansi from the Peking-Tientsin area because of 
Yen Hsi-shan's known anti-Japanese stand. They may have also 
been attracted by the fact that Shansi remained independent of 
the national government, which an increasing number of politi-
cally active people considered unduly hesitant in taking on the 
Japanese. Yen had called off his vendetta with the Kuomintang 
government in 1931, when the Japanese occupied Manchuria, 
but, like the students, he became increasingly uneasy about 
Chiang Kai-shek's reluctance to stop Japan's political infiltra-
tion of North China by military force. Yen shared with many 
others the feeling that the Kuomintang would be willing to sacri-
fice Shansi if this would induce Japan to forego further advances 
toward the lower Yangtze valley, which was the central govern-
ment's stronghold. 
These three elements, the anti-Japanese demonstrations, 
Yen's anti-Japanese sympathies, and his cool if no longer hostile 
attitude toward the Kuomintang government, combined to 
arouse the interest of the Communists in Shensi, whose main 
force had recently completed its Long March from Kiangsi. In 
the first two months of 1936, a large Communist force invaded 
Shansi and occupied eighteen counties against totally ineffectual 
opposition by Yen's army. Yen tried to regain these territories 
by asking for arms from the Kuomintang. But, like everyone 
else, the Kuomintang was alerted to Yen's vulnerability by the 
ease with which the Communists invaded Shansi. Thus, the 
national government seized this opportunity to proclaim a drive 
to oust the Communists and subject Shansi to central control.10 
It reached its first objective but not the second. 
Tha t Shansi was not integrated into the administrative struc-
ture of the national government was due neither to Yen Hsi-
shan's efforts nor to a reinvasion of Shansi by the Communists. 
The Kuomintang government left some troops in Shansi, but 
pulled out others which were needed for redeployment in other 
places. Thus, integration through forceful occupation was no 
longer possible, if indeed it was ever contemplated by the nation-
al government. But even if Chiang Kai-shek had attempted to 
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subject Shansi to central control through the use of force, and if 
he had had a large army to do it, and if Yen Hsi-shan had been 
submissive, which he certainly was not, the venture could not 
have succeeded. The presence of politically active and highly 
vocal groups in the cities would have made the position of the 
occupation force of the central government uncomfortable if not 
untenable. Moreover, these political activists who a short time 
later began to mobilize the peasants against the Japanese might 
have mobilized them against the central government troops. 
The ouster of the Communist forces from Shansi by the Kuo-
mintang armies did not put an end to the anti-Japanese agita-
tion in T'aiyiian. On the contrary, this agitation increased in 
direct proportion to political instability in Yen Hsi-shan's do-
main. Secret agents of Japan, of the Communists, and of the 
Kuomintang government converged on Shansi and particularly 
on its capital. The presence of the Japanese agents, many of 
whom scarcely bothered to hide their identity and indeed at 
times strutted about in an imperious manner, were chiefly re-
sponsible for a rapid rise in the political temperature in T'aiyii-
an. 
Yen Hsi-shan, who had created only in the previous year, 
1935, a so-called Justice Promotion Corps (Chuchang kungtao 
t'uan) as a panicky response to the Communist invasion, now 
seemed to be dissatisfied with the organization's almost single-
minded concern about the "Red Menace.'' Although sufficient 
documentary evidence is lacking, Yen Hsi-shan seemed to move 
toward a rapprochement with the Communists by summer of 
1936. Various sources suggest that Yen made an alliance with the 
Communists in summer or fall of 1936.11 In any case, it is certain 
that he started hiring known Communists to create a strong and 
viable anti-Japanese organization in his province. He placed his 
main trust in native Shansi men who were studying at Peking 
universities at the time. 
The most prominent among them was Po I-po. A native of 
Tinghsiang county, he had joined the Communist Party in 1926. 
While engaged in underground work in Peking in 1932, he was 
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arrested and jailed for three years. Soon after he was released, 
he was either invited by Yen Hsi-shan or sent by the CCP North 
China bureau to T'aiyiian in September of 1936.12 Po and other 
Communists quickly persuaded younger members of the Justice 
Promotion Corps to form a more militant organization, the Sacri-
fice National Salvation League (Hsisheng chiu-kuo fungmeng). 
With Yen Hsi-shan as its titular head, the League was inaugu-
rated on September 18, 1936, the fifth anniversary of the Muk-
den Incident, which Japan had used as a pretext to occupy 
Manchuria.13 
Yet despite its improved organization and its orientation to-
ward a united anti-Japanese stand, the Sacrifice League remained 
ineffective in the rural areas of Shansi.14 The reasons are not hard 
to find. Political consciousness was, after all, very much confined 
to the cities. In the countryside, appeals to patriotism and warn-
ings against Japanese imperialism fell on deaf ears. Patriotism 
and imperialism were not part of the traditional world view of 
the peasantry of North China. 
Thus the Sacrifice League spent most of its energies in the 
cities of Shansi. But, as mentioned earlier, the political situation 
in the cities was most complex. T'aiyiian and other urban cen-
ters teemed with spies, agents, and saboteurs of all political color-
ations. Some of the League's leaders felt that the best way for the 
League to gain the upper hand in such a setting was through in-
creased militancy, discipline, and weapons. Toward the end of 
1937, Po I-po and others persuaded Yen Hsi-shan to issue wea-
pons and ammunition to a new elite force within the Sacrifice 
League called the Shansi Youth Anti-Japanese Dare-to-Die 
Teams (Shansi ch'ingnien k'ang-Jih chilehssu tut) (35).15 
Virtually nothing is known about the effectiveness of the 
Sacrifice National Salvation League before the outbreak of the 
war. It is fair to assume that the remaining time, about half a 
year, was too short to effect any impact on the politics and society 
of Shansi. The Japanese armies which had been near the bor-
ders of Shansi immediately invaded the province and captured 
T'aiyiian on November 4. 
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The government of Yen Hsi-shan lost almost all control over 
Shansi, but the Japanese were unable to create a puppet govern-
ment to take its place. Topography was one obstacle in their 
path. The Japanese troops were able to occupy the major cities 
and the railroad lines and highways connecting them but they 
had difficulties in penetrating the mountain ranges. T h e T'ai-
hang and T'aiyiieh ranges, located between the T'ung-P'u 
(Tat'ung-P'uchou) Line and the eastern border of Shansi, were 
neither excessively high (between 3,000 and 6,000 feet) nor par-
ticularly rugged. But very few roads led into them, and the few 
existing roads were in poor condition and easily blocked by re-
sistance groups. For a highly mechanized army such as the 
Japanese, the mountains of Shansi were virtually inaccessible. 
The other obstacle in the path of Japanese attempts to set up 
a puppet government in Shansi was the continued lack of popular 
involvement in politics. The Japanese could not exploit ethnic 
antagonisms as they did in Eastern Inner Mongolia because 
there were none in Shansi. Nor could they find any levers such 
as a widespread identification with Shansi or with Japan. 
The Japanese had no difficulty, however, in finding individ-
uals who were willing to cooperate with them and even more 
people who were quite content with staying out of the war al-
together by not giving aid and comfort to anti-Japanese forces. 
Among those who openly cooperated with the Japanese in 
Shansi were Buddhist monks and paupers; moreover, much of 
the gentry, the traditional leadership in the rural areas, approved 
of their activities.16 
Part of the credit for this kind of cooperation must be given 
to Japanese efforts. As Liu Shao-ch'i illustrated, the Japanese 
conquest was not only a story of burning, killing, and raping, but 
also of posters telling the people that Chinese and Japanese were 
basically alike (49). Even the occasional sweeps which the Japa-
nese troops conducted did not alienate all the people from the 
Japanese, although casualties were inflicted on the civilian popu-
lation. In the document Liu gives the example of a village in 
northern Hopei, where the people refused to let Communist 
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guerrillas in because they blamed the Communists for losses in-
flicted by the Japanese (49-50). 
If the Japanese were unable to set up a province-wide govern-
ment in Shansi, they were reasonably successful in utilizing the 
existing traditional form of local government, the paochia sys-
tem. Paochia units, used in dynastic times to collect taxes and 
supervise the local population, were generally headed by mem-
bers of the gentry. The Japanese relied on these elements to lead 
so-called maintenance committees (weich'ih hui), which were re-
sponsible for the internal security of a village. A second method 
of control was to mobilize all able-bodied men into so-called self-
defense troops.17 As Liu reported, these troops turned out to be 
unreliable. Some units ran away as soon as they were issued 
money and weapons. As Liu Shao-ch'i reported, the Japanese 
slowed down the defection rate by integrating puppet soldiers 
into regular Japanese army units and by using them on duty in 
garrisons where they could be closely supervised (48). 
T h e sudden Japanese sweep into Shansi virtually eliminated 
the troops of Yen Hsi-shan and of the central government. While 
they suffered few casualties, these troops became so demoralized 
that most either fled or surrendered. Some small units withdrew 
into the mountains to take up guerrilla warfare. 
T h e disappearance of all organized military resistance 
brought the Communists back into Shansi. In early September 
of 1937, units of the three divisions of the newly designated 
Eighth Route Army entered Shansi from the west. T h e 115th 
Division under Lin Piao marched to the Wut'aishan area, the 
120th Division under Ho Lung went to Northwest Shansi, and 
the 129th Division commanded by Liu Po-ch'eng proceeded to 
the southeast.18 
During the following month, units of the 115th and 129th 
Divisions established permanent bases behind enemy lines. Liu 
Po-ch'eng led three regiments of the 129th Division, with 6,000 
veterans of the Long March, to set up a base in the T'aihang 
mountain range north of Ch'angchih.19 After several months of 
resting and regrouping, they moved again in early 1938, infil-
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trating the Japanese rear areas all the way to the Pacific coast of 
Shantung. On their way, they left small detachments behind to 
join local resistance groups. Because of their prior experience in 
guerrilla warfare, these men quickly rose to positions of leader-
ship.20 
The 115th Division was the first to clash with the Japanese 
when it fought at P'inghsing Pass on September 25, 1937. On 
October 23, the division's deputy commander and political com-
missar, Nieh Jung-chen, was ordered to establish the first per-
manent base in the Shansi-Hopei border area. Drawing from 
several units of the 115th Division, Nieh led a force composed 
of an independent corps, a cavalry battalion, and two incomplete 
regiments totaling about 2,000 men who, like Liu Po-ch'eng's 
men, were veterans of the Long March. They moved into the 
western edge of Hopei, and on November 7 they established the 
headquarters of the Chin-Ch'a-Chi military region.21 
The formation of Nieh's military region marked the begin-
ning of an eight-year period during which the Communists cre-
ated fourteen major outer base areas. They were Chin-Ch'a-
Chi, Shansi-Suiyiian, Shansi-Hopei-Honan-Shantung, Shantung, 
North Kiangsu, Central Kiangsu, South Kiangsu, North Huai, 
South Huai, Central Anhui, East Chekiang, Hupei-Honan-An-
hui, T u n g Chiang (the East River in Kwangtung), and Ch'iung 
Yai (the mountainous area on Hainan Island).22 For several rea-
sons, the most important of these was Chin-Ch'a-Chi, or officially 
the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Border Region. Formally established 
on January 15, 1938, it was the first organization of its kind and 
was, in Liu Shao-chTs words, "the first model for the whole na-
tion" (38).23 It served as a shield against Japanese attacks 
against the Communists' main base of Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia 
with headquarters at Yenan. Chin-Ch'a-Chi was also important 
because toward the end of the war, its theater of operations had 
enveloped most of the North China Plain and the strategic rail-
road trunk lines. 
In the remarkably short time of about two months, Nieh 
Jung-chen and his troops were able to organize a conference 
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which convened on January 10, 1938, in the small mountain town 
of Foup'ing in western Hopei.24 This conference, called the Pro-
visional Conference of Representatives of Parties, Troops, Gov-
ernments, and People of the Chin-Ch'a-Chi Border Region 
(Chin-Ch'a-Chi piench'u tang-chun-cheng-min linshih taipiao 
tahui), was attended by more than 200 delegates representing not 
only the Communist Party and the Eighth Route Army, but also 
the Kuomintang, Yen Hsi-shan's government, local militia units, 
and various mass organizations (37-8).25 Chin-Ch'a-Chi's govern-
ment which was elected at the close of the conference on January 
15 reflected this diversity.26 The chairman was Sung Shao-wen 
and the deputy chairman, Hu Jen-k'uei. Both were native Shan-
si men. T h e Kuomintang was represented by Liu Tien-chi (also 
known as Liu Tien-ch'iian) and the Communist Party by Nieh 
Jung-chen, who was concurrently the area's military commander. 
Chang Su represented Chahar and Sun Chih-yuan, Hopei.27 
Both men were Communist Party members. Three additional 
members of the government were Colonel Lu Chang-ts'ao, who 
had been a Nationalist regimental commander and who was 
soon to turn Communist and become commander of the Shansi-
Suiyiian base area, Lou Ning-hsien as the representative of the 
Sacrifice National Salvation League, and Li Chieh-yung.28 
Even more impressive than the broad representation of the 
delegates was the geographic extent of Chin-Ch'a-Chi at the 
time of its creation (see map). According to Liu Shao-ch'i, it 
comprised thirty-nine counties with a population of 12,000,000 
(38). Chou reported forty-four counties of which twenty-seven 
were relatively safe under the protection of regular Eighth Route 
Army troops and associated guerrilla units, and seventeen were 
defended by people's volunteers and guerrillas raised indepen-
dently by Hopei peasants.29 After their takeover of the mainland, 
the Communists claimed that by 1944 Chin-Ch'a-Chi had grown 
to 108 counties and 25,000,000 population.30 Liu claimed that 
the guerrilla forces had grown to 100,000 (35), but I surmise that 
this figure might have been somewhat generous. At any rate, 
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Taylor reported a claim of 60,000 to 70,000 made by Sung Shao-
wen at about the same time.31 
The speed with which the Communists were able to establish 
Chin-Ch'a-Chi and to organize large-scale resistance groups was 
amazing in light of the manifest inability of the Kuomintang and 
the Japanese to do likewise. Two reasons for the difference be-
tween the Communists and the Nationalists in this respect are 
often mentioned by students of that period. First, the Commu-
nists had extensive prior experience in guerrilla warfare. Second, 
having the advantage over the national government of being 
relatively unencumbered by large-scale organizations, they could 
achieve the flexibility necessary for waging successful guerrilla 
warfare. But there were other reasons which are described in 
Liu Shao-ch'i's report. 
As Liu makes clear, the political apathy of the peasantry, 
mentioned earlier, threatened to stymie the Communists as it 
did the Japanese, in filling the political void created by the flight 
of many government officials. 
Like the Japanese, the Communists started organizing at the 
local level. Their mobilization committees (tungyiian weiyuan-
hui), which assumed all political power at the local levels, 
appeared similar to the Japanese-sponsored maintenance com-
mittees in that both types were in charge of villages. But here 
the similarities ended. They differed radically in composition 
and methods. T h e maintenance committees remained basically 
unaltered from the pre-existing traditional paochia organiza-
tions; they were led by members of the richest and most presti-
gious families in a village. Most Communist-created mobiliza-
tion committees, on the other hand, were initially headed by 
poor people who were dissatisfied with the status quo. These 
people were in favor of drastic changes in the methods of orga-
nizing local society for a protracted war against Japan. 
Two other factors in the speedy creation of outer base areas 
were the presence of Communist organizers and the reentry into 
Shansi of the Eighth Route Army. Po I-po and others who be-
fore the outbreak of the war had been active in the formation of 
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anti-Japanese groups (see above) left T'aiyiian as the Japanese 
approached the Shansi capital. Instead of following Yen Hsi-shan 
in his retreat to Linfen (see p. 22), these Communist leaders 
fanned out into the countryside. Each led a Dare-to-Die team to 
a different part of the province. Po I-po, who had been the chief 
organizer of all such teams and of their parent organization, the 
Sacrifice National Salvation League, before the war, led several 
columns into the T'aiyiieh and T'aihang Mountains. Chang 
Wen-ang went to the west-northwest, Jung Tzu-ho (also known 
as Jung Wu-sheng) to the south-southwest, and Lei Jen-min to 
the north.32 As soon as they arrived at their new destinations, 
they assumed command over special geographic areas, each com-
prising several counties.33 
The three divisions of the Eighth Route Army which reen-
tered Shansi backed up the demands of civilian Communist or-
ganizers. As Liu Shao-ch'i implied, the presence of the Eighth 
Route Army was a powerful persuader for Yen Hsi-shan. Initial-
ly demurring, Yen had little choice but to accept Communist 
''suggestions'' to order a change in the tax laws and to establish 
a "National Revolutionary College" (mintsu homing tahsiieh) 
at Linfen (34).34 T h e Eighth Route Army also enforced an order 
issued by mobilization committees to form militia units which 
every man between twenty-eight and fifty years of age had to join. 
By early 1938, every county in Chin-Ch'a-Chi was said to have 
already had some 40,000 to 50,000 men in militia units (42). 
Emboldened by the presence of Eighth Route Army troops 
and by the dissatisfactions with their economic lot on the part of 
the newly installed local leaders, the Communists adopted some 
tough measures to stabilize the political situation and to mobil-
ize the population. The radical land policy, first applied in the 
Kiangsi Soviet in the early 1930's, had been shelved shortly before 
the outbreak of the war as an apparent quid pro quo for Chiang 
Kai-shek's halting of all military campaigns against the Yenan 
base area. However, when the mobilization committees took 
over, summary expropriations once again became common. T h e 
committees were given a free hand in redistributing land left be-
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hind by owners who had fled. According to Gillin, these refugees 
forfeited their land and all other possessions.35 Those who re-
mained behind were forced to contribute either labor or money, 
according to the slogan "money from those who can afford it, 
labor from those who can render it" ("yu ch'ien ch'u ch'ien, yu 
li cKu li") (43).36 People who resisted the high-handed manner 
in which the mobilization committees exacted their tribute were 
branded as traitors and faced possible execution (44). 
Gillin (pp. 269-70) thinks that such accusations placed a "for-
midable weapon'' in the hands of the mobilization committees 
and the Eighth Route Army. Liu Shao-ch'i, on the other hand, 
implied that these Draconian measures tended to undermine 
rather than strengthen the Communists' efforts to organize the 
people against the Japanese. Hence his warning that all "com-
pulsory contributions are absolutely prohibited" (44). Likewise, 
the outright confiscation of wealth was to be stopped. Liu or-
dered the formation of "refugee property liquidation commit-
tees" (nanmin ts'aich'an ch'ingli weiyiianhui). These acted as 
caretakers of all abandoned property which was to be restored to 
its original owners upon their return (44).37 
Liu's assessment was probably closer to the mark. More in-
timate knowledge of the Chinese peasants' social and psycholo-
gical milieu gave the Communists the edge over the Japanese in 
their competition for popular participation in the war. But the 
charge of traitor could not have made much of an impact on the 
peasants without intensive indoctrination. In the context in 
which it was used, the word "traitor" presupposed a clear and 
strong identification with the nation on the part of the peasants. 
Most traditional societies lack such identification, and Liu Shao-
ch'i's report would seem to confirm that this was the case in 
North China. 
One might look upon the contact between the Communist 
organizers and the peasants as a meeting of two dissimilar world 
views. The organizers, many with urban backgrounds and all 
politically active, had a dichotomous world view which neatly 
divided all people into "we" and "they." Under the threat of an 
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invasion, most relatively modernized societies implicitly accept 
this dichotomous division. The only difference in this respect 
between the Communist organizers in 1937 and other modern-
ized people was that the Communists, because of their combative 
ideology, meant "we" against "them." What they overlooked, as 
many other modernized people still do, is that in a traditional 
society there is a third alternative. The North China peasants 
in early 1938 did not consider themselves as belonging to either 
"us" or "them." Unless they were wooed rather than coerced, 
they would stay neutral in the conflict. 
This possibility would have been fatal to the Communists , 
long-range strategy. As bitter as the war against Japan was, it 
was viewed merely as a prelude to the ultimate struggle against 
the Kuomintang for the supreme prize, China. Like the Japa-
nese, the national government had overwhelming superiority in 
regular troops and materiel. The Communists could not hope to 
meet either foe on his terms. Politicization and mobilization of 
the civilian population was the only alternative. 
Liu Shao-chTs report was mainly concerned with this alter-
native. His recommendations can be divided into two parts of 
uneven length. He had relatively little to say about military 
matters, partly because he had little personal experience, but 
mostly because he thought, and rightly so, that within the broad 
limits of the third alternative, military success was based almost 
completely on success in the essentially civilian task of organizing 
and winning over the people. 
When the Japanese attack smashed Yen Hsi-shan's hold over 
Shansi, it created chaos not only in the political field but also in 
military matters. According to Liu, there were at least eleven 
different types of armed forces, including anti-Japanese bandits, 
Red Spears, and Black Spears, besides the Communist, Nation-
alist, and regional armies and their attached guerrilla forces (34, 
41). Liu asked for unified local military commands to coordinate 
battle plans among the various forces (41). Fighting power was 
to be augmented by large-scale arming of the peasants. These 
militia units were to be part-time soldiers; when not working in 
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the fields, they were to be used in auxiliary positions such as 
medics, sentries, and demolition specialists. Because of the acute 
lack of arms at that time, the militia had to make do with kitchen 
knives, hammers, and other tools (42). Once the forces were 
coordinated and expanded, intensive political indoctrination 
was to be applied (35). 
Liu devoted most of his attention to civilian matters. His 
detailed blueprint for involving the people in the war on the 
side of the Communists consisted of three main parts: (1) in-
ducements for the people within base areas; (2) methods for 
winning over and organizing these people; and (3) methods for 
winning over pro-Japanese government officials and troops. 
The inducements consisted mainly of the abolition of cer-
tain taxes which the people had considered unreasonable and of 
the reduction of land taxes and rents. The maximum rate for 
rent was set at thirty-seven per cent of the main crop, which was 
the figure first suggested by Sun Yat-sen but rarely enforced by 
previous governments. At the same time, the Communists prom-
ised to guarantee a fixed dependable income for landlords. Liu 
also thought that paochia organizations should be used as much 
as possible (40). The reason for the conciliatory attitude toward 
the former village leaders was that after the initial harsh treat-
ment of landlords and other relatively rich people (see above), 
the Communist realized that optimum popular cooperation 
could not be achieved until the traditional village leaders were 
kept reasonably content. 
Liu Shao-chTs suggestions for winning over the people with-
in the base areas as well as government officials and troops work-
ing for the Japanese showed great flexibility. Liu revealed that 
many people refused at first to cooperate with the Eighth Route 
Army. He suggested a remedy for each of six different situations 
(31-3). In each case, Liu counseled forbearance and patience in 
the hope that eventually these people would voluntarily cooper-
ate with the Communists. 
The same patience was advocated toward officials and troops 
working for the Japanese. Far from being rigidly hostile toward 
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them, Liu stressed to the K'ang T a students that they must make 
a sharp distinction between a small handful of incorrigible col-
laborators and the great majority, which for want of an acceptable 
alternative had been passively cooperating with the enemy. In a 
lengthy section (45-9), he gave several examples of the correct 
methods toward these persons. Basically, government officials 
were permitted to keep their jobs in maintenance committees as 
long as they kept the Eighth Route Army informed and did not 
actively support the Japanese. T o ensure that maintenance com-
mittees remained innocuous, Communist agents, including 
graduates from K'ang Ta, were ordered to infiltrate these com-
mittees. T h e basic method toward pro-Japanese troops was not 
to engage them in battle unless forced to do so. As the anecdote 
about the "little orderly" was meant to show, every effort was 
made to persuade these troops that their basic interests lay with 
other Chinese such as the Eighth Route Army. 
The Man 
The document also raises some intriguing questions about 
Liu Shao-ch'i himself. I will try to answer three: Where was he 
when Chin-Ch'a-Chi was created? In what capacity did he report 
on the creation of that outer base area? What was his influence 
in the Party relative to Mao? 
Standard biographical dictionaries, such as Who's Who in 
Communist China, shed little light on these questions, which the 
current cultural revolution has made crucially important.38 
These sources report that Liu was secretary of the CCP North 
China bureau in 1936-7, so that it would appear that he delivered 
his report in that capacity. But Who's Who adds that Liu was 
"in charge of North Bureau work in Peking in spring of 1937; 
sec, central bureau; left Yenan and on way inspected Shansi-
Shantung-Honan Area, Sept. 1939."39 The dictionary does not 
reveal when Liu was appointed secretary of the "central bureau." 
Without documentation, Warren Kuo claims that Liu was dis-
missed from his post as secretary of the North China bureau and 
reassigned as secretary of the central organization department 
after the Soviet Area Party Congress in May, 1937.40 
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A biography of Liu Shao-ch'i, remarkable both for furnish-
ing data not obtainable elsewhere and for its muckraking inves-
tigation into Liu's private life, was published by a leading Red 
Guard organization in Peking in May, 1967.41 This biography 
says that Liu was appointed in spring of 1936 as secretary of the 
CCP North China bureau, which was then located in Peking. 
Presumably going directly from the Yenan base area, he arrived 
in Peking and Tientsin in April of that year and started direct-
ing underground work. He remained in the Peking-Tientsin 
area until April of 1937, when he returned to Yenan to partici-
pate in the Soviet Area Party Congress, held from May 3 until 
sometime after May 20.42 
Liu Shao-ch'i apparently returned to Peking immediately 
after the conference. When war with Japan broke out on July 
7, he transferred the North China bureau to T'aiyiian. He was 
accompanied by Chou En-lai and P'eng Chen.43 T'aiyiian was 
the seat of Yen Hsi-shan, governor of Shansi, who was then ap-
pointed by the national government as commander-in-chief of 
the Second War Zone, comprising all of North China. The Com-
munists, while formally subordinating themselves to Yen's over-
all command, sought by various means to guide Yen's actions 
along lines they considered favorable (34, 50-1). The North 
China bureau under Liu Shao-ch'i, by being transferred to T'ai-
yiian, played the central role in this phase of United Front diplo-
macy. 
As soon as he had resettled the North China bureau in T'ai-
yiian, Liu Shao-ch'i once again travelled to Yenan to attend the 
strategy conference of the political bureau at Lochuan on August 
22. The rapid advance of the Japanese armies toward T'aiyiian 
forced Liu to hurry back to the North China bureau and once 
again transfer it farther westward.44 T'aiyiian was evacuated on 
November 4 by Yen Hsi-shan's command, Li Ch'ang's National 
Liberation Vanguards (mintsu chiehfang hsienfeng tui)*5 and 
other organizations as well as by Liu Shao-ch'i's North China 
bureau.46 The new headquarters of Yen Hsi-shan and of the 
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North China bureau was Linfen in the south-west portion of 
Shansi, and quite close to Shensi and the Yenan base area. 
Available biographical data are not very detailed about Liu's 
whereabouts after that date, particularly in January of 1938, when 
Chin-Ch'a-Chi was created. It is known that he went to Yenan 
later in November of 1937 to attend a conference of Party acti-
vists.47 During his absence, he delegated routine work on the 
North China bureau to P'eng Chen. Whether he remained in 
Yenan until March of 1938 when he delivered his report at K'ang 
Ta or returned in the meantime to Linfen is not known at this 
time. He may have travelled to Linfen, a relatively short dis-
tance from Yenan and not yet endangered by Japanese forces, 
but I doubt that Liu went as far as Chin-Ch'a-Chi. 
There are two reasons for this conjecture. First, Liu made 
no mention of any personal participation in the establishment of 
Chin-Ch'a-Chi in his report. Without accepting present-day 
charges by the Maoists that Liu was indulging at that time in 
self-praise,481 think that Liu would have made references to his 
presence had he actually been in Chin-Ch'a-Chi. In a report 
such as this, full of detailed, almost anecdotal examples, a per-
sonal note would have fitted in quite naturally. 
Second, his known whereabouts at specified times tend to 
suggest that Liu was not in Chin-Ch'a-Chi in January of 1938. 
While it is theoretically possible for him to have done so, it is 
not likely that he travelled all the way from either Yenan or Lin-
fen to Chin-Ch'a-Chi and back to Yenan in the relatively short 
time of three months. Chin-Ch'a-Chi was at the opposite end of 
the province from Linfen, and Foup'ing, where the inaugural 
conference was held, was still farther east in Hopei province (see 
map). Virtually the entire territory between Linfen and Chin-
Ch'a-Chi was in Japanese hands, and travel there had conse-
quently become hazardous and time-consuming. 
The next question concerns Liu's position in the Party at the 
time he delivered the report at K'ang Ta. As mentioned earlier, 
the title of this report would suggest that he spoke as the secre-
tary of the North China bureau to which he had been appointed 
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in spring of 1936. Warren Kuo claims, again without documen-
tation, that Liu was dismissed from the North China bureau in 
May of 1937 and reassigned as secretary of the central organiza-
tion department (see note 40 above). This alleged reassignment 
is probably identical to the undated reference in Who's Who to 
the "central bureau' ' (see note 39 above) inasmuch as the latter 
source also reports that Yang Shang-k'un was secretary of the 
North China bureau in 1937.49 Li Ch'ang, the leader of the Na-
tional Liberation Vanguards, reported, however, that Liu was 
still the secretary of the North China bureau in February of 
1938.50 Moreover, according to two other Communist publica-
tions, Liu kept that post until October, 1938, when he was ap-
pointed secretary of the Central Plains bureau (chung-yuan 
chii).51 
The weight of the evidence leads me to the conclusion that 
Liu Shao-ch'i was still the secretary of the North China bureau 
and probably concurrently director of the central organization 
department when he made his report at K'ang Ta. His concur-
rent appointment in the latter organization may have been only 
for the duration of his frequent visits to Yenan, which I described 
earlier. It should be added that the phenomenon of concurrently 
holding several posts has been exceedingly common among the 
Chinese Communists. 
This leads us to the third question, Liu's influence within 
the Party relative to Mao. Liu's dual roles as head of Party 
operations in the entire North China area and as chief of the or-
ganization department of the entire Party made Liu one of the 
top Party leaders. The authoritative manner in which he tells 
the K'ang Ta students precisely what they could expect in the 
outer base areas and behind enemy lines and what they were to 
do seemed to reflect Liu's high position within the Party leader-
ship. There has been reason to believe that by March of 1938 
his influence had risen close to that of Mao Tse-tung, Chou En-
lai, and Chu Te. 
At the outbreak of the war, Mao's actual influence within the 
Party was undoubtedly greater than Liu's, although probably 
23 
smaller than the image presented to outsiders like Edgar Snow. 
But as soon as the war began, Liu Shao-chTs influence in the 
Party began to rise rapidly. It was in his area, North China, where 
the war began and where both the Japanese attacks and the op-
portunities created by the breakdown of Chinese administration 
demanded speedy and decisive solutions by the Communists. As 
secretary of the North China bureau and director of the central 
organization department, Liu Shao-ch'i had a voice and perhaps 
even the predominant voice in the formulation of these solutions. 
His rapid rise into the top echelon of the Party also seemed 
to be indicated in a curious sentence in his report (36). He ad-
monished the K'ang Ta students to "study especially well con-
crete working methods, not merely theories, not merely this one 
set of 'Unity of Contradictions/ " It is probable that this state-
ment was directed against Mao Tse-tung who gave lectures on 
philosophical matters at the same school in July and August of 
1937, which were eventually published as his famous essays "On 
Practice'* and "On Contradiction." 
Mao's position within the Party leadership was far from be-
ing unchallengeable, and Mao was subjected to ridicule by his 
peers for his first bungling steps into Marxist-Leninist ideology. 
According to Sheng Shih-ts'ai, then governor of Sinkiang, two 
Communist leaders indicated to him in November of 1940 that 
Mao Tse-tung's attempts at writing on ideology did not impress 
his co-leaders. Fang Lin, the Eighth Route Army representative 
in Sinkiang, spoke of Mao's "dialectics" as being "full of errors." 
Chou En-lai, who shortly thereafter passed through Sinkiang on 
his way to Moscow, said in a characteristic understatement that 
Mao "might have missed some of the theoretical points."52 
Liu's remarks are probably the first instance when one of 
Mao's co-leaders openly criticized his ventures into philosophical 
writing. Liu's remarks probably had a big impact because they 
were made at the same school where Mao had lectured only 
seven months earlier to the same students.53 
Whatever Liu's opinion may have been about Mao's qualifi-
cations as a writer on philosophical subjects, his criticism was 
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probably directed against Mao's apparent failure to deal with the 
problems of building outer base areas. I say "apparent" because 
we cannot be entirely certain that Mao did not devote time to 
these problems. Not surprisingly, one of the main themes dur-
ing the last few years and particularly during the cultural revo-
lution has been the claim that Mao had been the main guide for 
the successful formation of outer base areas during the war 
against Japan. The claim may possibly be true. But if Mao was 
indeed deeply concerned with the creation of outer base areas, 
his concern was not reflected in his voluminous writings of the 
period that he chose to have included in his Selected Works. If 
he ever lectured, as Liu had, on the tasks of building outer base 
areas, his lectures cannot be found in his selected works. 
T h e first two statements by Mao after the outbreak of the 
war, "Fantui Jihpen chinkung ti fangchi, panfa ho ch'ientu" 
("Policies, measures, and perspectives for resisting the Japanese 
invasion") (July 23, 1937) and "Wei tungyiian ich'ieh liliang 
chengch'u k'ang-chan shengli erh toucheng" ("For the mobiliza-
tion of all the nation's forces for victory in the war of resistance") 
(August 25, 1937) were substantially identical appeals to the na-
tion as a whole.54 Anti-Kuomintang polemics dominated both 
essays. T h e small portion devoted by Mao to the all-important 
problem of organizing the people was the most perfunctory sec-
tion of all. His discussion of how to "improve the people's liveli-
hood" was no discussion at all but a list of points such as "abolish 
exorbitant taxes and miscellaneous levies" and "reduce rent and 
interest." Mao had nothing to say on mass organization or, most 
importantly, on the creation of outer base areas. 
While Chinese government armies were fighting heroically 
against the Japanese at Shanghai and his own co-leaders of the 
Communist Party were busily deploying their troops for the ex-
pected Japanese onslaught toward the Yenan base area, Mao 
Tse-tung felt the urgent need to write a short piece on how to 
combat liberalism, "Fantui tzuyu-chuyi" ("Combat liberalism") 
(September 7, 1937).55 On September 29, 1937, he wrote another 
essay on what he considered to be urgent tasks, which showed no 
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interest in base areas, mass organization, and similar steps to 
stem the Japanese tide in North China. It was instead a lengthy 
recapitulation of Kuomintang-Communist relations since the 
1920,s.56 
When the Japanese armies were about to capture T'aiyiian, 
capital of the strategic province of Shansi, which adjoined the 
Yenan base area, and when Liu Shao-ch'i assumed the task of 
evacuating the North China bureau, Mao Tse-tung's chief con-
tribution was an interview with a British newspaperman in 
which he again talked about relations between the two major 
parties.57 When Shanghai and T'aiyiian fell to the Japanese, Mao 
spent several pages to urge "the nation'' not to capitulate, but he 
had almost nothing to say about practical ways to stop the Japa-
nese.58 He referred only once to problems within outer base areas 
when he said that "warlordism" within the Eighth Route Army 
must be stopped. What Mao meant by "warlordism" was what 
Liu called "signs of corruption and arrogance" (35). In light of 
Mao's apparent disinterest in the problems facing his co-leaders 
who were building outer base areas at that time, it is safe to say 
that the initiative in combating this tendency came not from 
Yenan but was taken by the base commanders. 
Among Mao's various writings dated in the first year of the 
war, only one small section of one essay was devoted to the prob-
lem of outer base areas. In his "K'ang-Jih yuchi chancheng ti 
chanliieh went'i" ("Problems of strategy in guerrilla war against 
Japan"),59 one of the nine chapters (Chapter VI) was on the "es-
tablishment of base areas." This essay, written in May of 1938, 
is the only document on which Mao can be compared with Liu 
Shao-ch'i. Like Liu, Mao pointed out that the establishment of 
base areas was vitally important under conditions of a protracted 
war. But unlike Liu, Mao almost completely avoided a discus-
sion of specific problems and recommendations. 
The most revealing difference between the two men lies in 
the priority of conditions which they attached to establishing 
base areas. Mao mentioned only three conditions: military 
force, the coordination of regular military forces with other 
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armed units, and the winning over of the people. Mao, who at 
various times has been praised as the chief advocate of the mass 
line and the people's best friend, placed the lowest priority on 
the people. By contrast, Liu Shao-ch'i in his report at K'ang Ta, 
specified five conditions, two of which dealt with the people. 
Most important in Liu's opinion were political conditions, by 
which he meant "a government carrying on vigorously the war 
of resistance [and] able to organize, arm, and guide the masses in 
the resistance against Japan." His third priority went to social 
conditions under which "the broad masses must be organized, 
trained, and armed. These masses must be able to cooperate with 
the troops and government in order to fight with unity and co-
ordination" (36).60 Liu's deep appreciation of the people's im-
portance was revealed in another part of his report where he 
stated categorically that "the most important task of the day is: 
Motivate the masses of North China to enter the battle of resis-
tance against Japan, to take up arms and struggle against the 
Japanese and establish strong anti-Japanese bases in order to 
fight the Japanese for a long period" (39). 
Those students of K'ang Ta who were destined for duty in 
outer base areas and behind enemy lines and the Communist 
leaders there needed specific instructions for specific situations. 
We do not know whether Mao supplied such instructions, but 
we do know from this document that Liu did. 
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Work Experiences in the 
North China War Zone 
Liu Shao-ch'i 
Lecture delivered at K'ang Ta on March 21, 1938.1 
/ . The Anti-Japanese National United Front in North China 
I wish to speak about the experiences and lessons of the 
United Front in North China since the Lukouch'iao2 Incident. 
At the time of the Lukouch'iao Incident, [the situation in] North 
China was most complicated and contradictory. There had been 
all kinds of troops and factions, various thoughts, dissimilar ac-
tions, and no unified command. There had been resistance 
against Japan (most people were resisting Japan) but also vacil-
lation and compromise. Moreover, puppet troops and puppet 
regimes had been set up. In these regimes, Chinese government 
control had been comparatively weak, the strength of our war 
resistance relatively small and the enemy strong. Under such 
actual conditions, skillful methods are called for to unite all fac-
tions and troops to stand together against the Japanese. At that 
time, we adopted the United Front Policy, decreased friction 
between various parties and factions, strengthened the control 
of the central government, and opposed all wavering and com-
promising elements. When this activity started, the attitudes of 
all factions concerning the United Front were not unanimous, 
some advocating working together against the Japanese, others 
not. Some were against, and others advocated cooperating with 
a "but." Especially the attitudes concerning cooperation with 
the Communist Party were not identical; and therefore, the 
methods of carrying out the United Front also have not been 
identical; and various methods have been applied to improve the 
situation. For instance: 
(a) Some people have advocated resistance against Japan, but 
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have consistently opposed the Communist Party and progressive 
methods (such as starting mass movements, reforming political 
organizations, developing guerrilla warfare, etc.) and have not 
supported the United Front. How should we approach these 
people? Of course, we cannot be against them. We are better off 
to adopt a firm cooperative attitude which might then activate 
their lower strata. Consequently, many people have expressed 
their willingness for partial cooperation, and the stubborn ele-
ments, being isolated, have lost their authority. Because of our 
sincere attitude and firm cooperation as well as increasing attacks 
by Japanese imperialism, many people later have also cooperated 
with us. 
(b) Some people have approved the United Front yet have 
not been cooperating openly but secretly. With these people we 
should certainly not insist on open cooperation. We can secretly 
cooperate with them and later gradually change to open coopera-
tion. 
(c) Some people have approved cooperation with the Eighth 
Route Army but not with the Communist Party. We can, of 
course, cooperate with these people under the name of the Eighth 
Route Army. 
(d) Some people have wanted to cooperate with the lower 
strata, but not with the upper strata. We should approve their 
opinions and promote cooperation with the lower strata. 
(e) Some people have advocated going further than the Com-
munist Party (such as improving the troops, organizing the 
masses, guerrilla warfare, liquidating traitors, etc.) but they have 
wished to do it themselves and not to cooperate with us. We 
should approve their work, help them, and make suggestions to 
them. Gradually they will see that the methods of the Commu-
nist Party are not wrong. [If they should] declare: "We wish 
only the methods of the Communist Party, not Communists , , but 
still prefer doing it secretly, then publicize these methods under 
their name. At any rate, as long as they are willing to adopt our 
methods, this will maintain resistance against Japan. 
(f) Some people have expressed the idea of cooperating with 
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the Communist Party in order to oppose XXXX and Com-
mander-in-Chief Yen.3 Other factions have expressed their wil-
lingness to cooperate with the Communist Party in order to 
oppose other factions. We should refuse their requests and ex-
plain very clearly to them that cooperation is good but opposing 
XXXX and Commander-in-Chief Yen is not. At this time of 
national crisis, we must not fight among ourselves but should 
fight united against the foreigners. If they understand this truth, 
they will be willing to cooperate with us even better. If they are 
unwilling, quit arguing with them. 
But some people who have not been satisfied with us have 
spread rumors in order to destroy the Communist Party. There 
have been some people in Shansi who wrongfully issued state-
ments in the name of the Communist Party attacking Comman-
der-in-Chief Yen in an attempt to split the United Front. Fortu-
nately, because Commander-in-Chief Yen profoundly trusts the 
attitudes and proposals of our Communist Party, he knows that 
those statements have not been made by the Communist Party. 
People like these are bandits, traitors, enemy spies, and are pub-
lic enemies of the entire nation. We should firmly oppose them 
and demand their arrest and disposal. 
We may draw a conclusion from this: In order to carry out 
the anti-Japanese national United Front, it will not do to adopt 
one simple method, but it shall be necessary to use every kind of 
viable method. Most importantly we must have a definite policy, 
a definite principle, and that is to unite all strength that can be 
united to beat Japan, to resist the Japanese invasion. If there is 
no resistance against Japan, let us not talk about a United Front! 
While carrying out the United Front, we also obtained this 
experience and lesson: although it is necessary to have a definite 
program and a definite form, we should not be stubborn but 
creatively adopt every kind of method. 
In the beginning, we may cooperate on a concrete problem 
and a concrete action. For instance, we may fight better jointly 
with a certain guerrilla team. If we win the battle through co-
operation, we may give them the victor's spoils to make them feel 
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the benefits of cooperating with the Eighth Route Army. After 
cooperating with us successively two and three times, they will 
naturally bring forward the question of long-term cooperation. 
During the cooperation, criticism is essential, but criticism 
should be sincere and not undermine their authority. 
Many comrades have not been able to creatively adopt [this 
method]. They have simply demanded open cooperation based 
upon the entire program. Thus they have caused friction to in-
crease to the point of deviating from the principle of the United 
Front. This is a great error. 
Comrades! We must maintain independence in our work. 
We must actively carry out whatever work we consider must be 
done and could be done. Let the masses see the achievements of 
actual work. 
For example, in Shansi Commander-in-Chief Yen at first was 
scared of the Communist Party. While in T'aiyiian, he did not 
accept our proposal to establish a college for the training of 
youth cadres. Later when we established a training class and 
many youths came, he at once established a National Revolution-
ary College at Linfen.4 Commander-in-Chief Yen also did not 
agree with our suggestions to abolish harsh taxes. Later, after 
we advanced and received support from the broad masses, Com-
mander-in-Chief Yen issued an order to abolish harsh taxes. 
Therefore, the United Front is not merely something to talk 
about, but something to first do about. 
Because of sharply increased Japanese attacks, the efforts of 
the Communist Party, and the determined war resistance of the 
military leaders in North China, the North China United Front 
has been making daily progress and many military bases have al-
ready been established in North China. 
At present, our Commander-in-Chief Chu [Te] and Deputy 
Commander-in-Chief P'eng [Te-huai] are not only directing the 
Eighth Route Army, but also many troops (such as Central Gov-
ernment armies, Szechwan armies, Northeastern armies, militia 
units, etc.) are fighting under the command of Commanding 
Generals Chu and P'eng. In the Chin-Ch'a-Chi [Hopei, Chahar, 
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and Shansi] Border Area, a border area government has been es-
tablished (Provisional Administrative Committee of the Chin-
Ch'a-Chi Border Area) and our Comrade Nieh [Jung-chen] is on 
the committee representing the Communist Party. The mobili-
zation committees in many places in Shansi also have been 
changed from obscure to active organizations. Also many cor-
rupt elements in the government have been purged. New 
strength has been added and many orders have been promulgated 
(such as rent-reduction, tax-reduction, abolition of harsh taxes, 
the care of dependents of anti-Japanese soldiers, organization of 
the masses, etc.). There has also been progress among the troops. 
Mobile tactics have been learned, discipline has been raised, 
political departments have been established, an outline for poli-
tical education has been proclaimed, and political work among 
the troops has begun. New troops have been established, and 
"Shansi Youth Anti-Japanese Dare-to-Die Teams5 '5 have been 
organized. The present strength of guerrilla forces is 100,000 
and guerrilla armed forces have been extensively organized. 
Mass organizations have been universally established and every 
locality has peasant national salvation associations, women's as-
sociations, and labor unions. The people's livelihood has also 
been improved. All this proves the progress of the United Front, 
and this progress has made North China one of the important 
strategic centers of the war of determined resistance. 
In order to further develop the United Front and to guaran-
tee victory in the anti-Japanese war, all have realized the extra-
ordinary necessity for establishing united political and military 
leadership organizations. 
With regard to the direction of the tenacious United Front 
of the Communist Party in Shansi, our graduates from K'ang T a 
have been of great service, but there have also been weak points. 
First, some cadres of the Eighth Route Army have shown 
signs of corruption and arrogance while working outside the 
base areas. This cannot be accepted. I hope that you students 
pay special attention to this point. You must make strenuous 
efforts to carry on the spirit of the Eighth Route Army. At the 
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same time, you must study with a friendly and humble attitude. 
Second, there has been a lack of methods and practical ex-
periences in our work. On this point, I hope that you students 
will study especially well concrete working methods, not merely 
theories, not merely this one set of "Unity of Contradictions/' 
77. Establishing Anti-Japanese Bases 
a. The feasibility of establishing anti-Japanese bases and 
their future. 
It is necessary to establish anti-Japanese bases behind the 
Japanese lines if the war of resistance in North China and all 
over the country is to be maintained. Because many places in 
North China and throughout the country have been left for the 
Japanese to occupy, we have been unwilling to abandon them, 
and will engage the Japanese in a long and hard6 war in order to 
recover them. Now we want to launch large-scale guerrilla war-
fare; but in order to sustain long-term guerrilla warfare, we must 
have guerrilla bases. It is necessary, therefore, to establish anti-
Japanese bases. 
Is it possible to set up such anti-Japanese bases behind the 
Japanese lines? We say it is. Such a possibility has already been 
evidenced by the Chin-Ch'a-Chi border area. Our Eighth Route 
Army has already established strong anti-Japanese bases there. 
The following conditions are necessary for establishing anti-
Japanese bases. 
(1) Political conditions: A government carrying on vigor-
ously the war of resistance [and] able to organize, arm, and guide 
the masses in the resistance against Japan. 
(2) Military conditions: Sufficient armed strength for self-
defense to guarantee that this area will not be destroyed by the 
Japanese and to fight the Japanese. 
(3) Social7 conditions: The broad masses must be organized, 
trained, and armed. These masses must be able to cooperate with 
the troops and government in order to fight with unity and co-
ordination. 
(4) Topographic conditions: the terrain is good where guer-
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rilla teams can develop and where the Japanese have a disadvan-
tage. The best terrain has poor transportation and is hilly. 
(5) A tenacious war of resistance throughout the nation: 
This is the most important condition because it will not isolate 
us in the enemy's rear areas, it will prevent the Japanese from 
using their superior military strength to destroy guerrilla teams, 
and it will cause their rear areas to become more empty, and it 
will help our development. 
Under these conditions it is not only possible to establish anti-
Japanese bases, but there is also a victorious future. We are able 
to fight the Japanese for several years and will in the end defeat 
them and recover the lost territories although during a long war 
we should be prepared for the Japanese to dispatch troops against 
our bases. The Japanese have already moved troops to attack 
Chin-Ch'a-Chi border area. In the future, if the Japanese should 
occupy places like Hsuchou, T'ungkuan, Chengchou, they might 
temporarily stop moving southward and concentrate their 
strength for attacks on our anti-Japanese bases. Thus, under 
such difficult fighting conditions the anti-Japanese bases might 
shrink and several counties and towns might be occupied by the 
Japanese. But we shall not lose, and we shall still have a victori-
ous future. 
For your better understanding, I will now report some actual 
cases.8 
In the Chin-Ch'a-Chi border area, there are Comrade Nieh 
Jung-chen, commander of the Eighth Route Army area (deputy 
commander of the 115th Division), and administrative chiefs, 
county magistrates, and Sacrifice National Salvation League or-
ganizations under the direct command of Commander-in-Chief 
Yen. After the Japanese occupied T'aiyiian and the T'ung-P'u 
Line,9 this base became the rear of the Japanese. The Japanese 
have been unable to occupy this area. On the contrary, a mass 
militia has arisen and an anti-Japanese government named the 
Provisional Committee of the Chin-Ch'a-Chi Border Area10 has 
been established. In January 1938, a representative conference11 
was convened and attended by representatives of the armed 
37 
forces, all parties and factions, all mass organizations, the mass 
militia, and the government totaling more than two hundred per-
sons. It passed decisions on political, financial, economic, educa-
tional, military, women, and mass movement affairs. Nine per-
sons were elected to the government committee. After the elec-
tion a report was sent to Commander-in-Chief Yen who acknowl-
edged it, and a report was sent to the Executive Yuan and the 
Military Affairs Committee of the central government and re-
ceived the central government's approval. A declaration and 
a circular telegram were issued. This government comprises 
thirty-nine counties with a population of 12,000,000. Represen-
tatives were sent not only from west of the Peiping-Hankow Line, 
but also from places east of [this] line such as Paoting, and 
others.12 
It is extraordinarily significant that since then it has become 
the first model for the whole nation telling the whole nation 
about the method of establishing anti-Japanese bases behind the 
Japanese lines. It has proved not only the establishment of a 
government in the Chin-Ch'a-Chi Border Area Government, 
but also that other Japanese-occupied areas (Kiangsu, Chekiang, 
Shantung, Shansi, and the areas north of the Yellow River) 
should and could establish such border area governments as well. 
This kind of border area government has already been approved 
by the [Party] Central, and its declaration and decisions have 
been significant across the country. 
Some comrades have raised a question like this: Is it not pos-
sible to establish an anti-Japanese base in the plains? 
We say that although the topographic conditions there favor 
the enemy and not us, there are other conditions capable of sup-
porting guerrilla warfare and establishing bases. In North 
China, we have seen that the Japanese have not had the military 
strength to occupy the entire plain of Hopei and Shantung. Be-
cause China is a large country and there are not enough Japan-
ese soldiers to be distributed, China's firm war of resistance has 
forced most Japanese troops to be sent to the front lines [and 
hence] has depleted their rear areas. Therefore, it is possible in 
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the plains to maintain guerrilla warfare for several years and to 
establish fairly firm anti-Japanese bases. 
The Japanese attempt to subdue guerrilla warfare in North 
China and to pacify North China will not succeed. As long as 
our work there is good, there is good leadership from strategists 
and guerrilla experts, and there are good mass organizations and 
weapons, we can carry on a long-term guerrilla war. Therefore, 
whether in the mountains or in the plains, the most important 
task of the day is: Motivate the masses of North China to enter 
the battle of resistance against Japan, to take up arms and 
struggle against the Japanese and establish strong anti-Japanese 
bases in order to fight the Japanese for a long period. 
b. How to establish anti-Japanese bases: 
1. Establishing a unified anti-Japanese government—estab-
lish a government like that of Chin-Ch'a-Chi. The special fea-
tures of such a government are: (1) The local government of the 
Republic of China under direct central control with close rela-
tions to the Central Government and carrying out its laws and 
orders. (2) A government absolutely opposed to the government 
of the traitors and puppets. (3) A people's government, a demo-
cratic government capable of organizing and arming the masses, 
of improving the people's livelihood, and thus gaining the peo-
ple's support. The responsible persons of such government are 
the anti-Japanese leaders. (4) Kuomintang and United Front 
governments are not additional people's governments in opposi-
tion to the National Government, but they make the Kuomin-
tang Government truly a people's government capable of con-
solidating the broad masses of all classes for struggling against 
the Japanese under the government's guidance. 
In order to establish such a united anti-Japanese people's 
government of the Kuomintang and the United Front, the dis-
orderly situation must first be ended and a spirit of resistance 
against Japan and of revolution be recovered. The sooner we 
establish our government the better. If the county magistrate 
had run away, the anti-Japanese troops may deputize one; if the 
county magistrate had not run away, he should be examined 
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whether he has been anti-Japanese or a traitor, and he should be 
properly dealt with. But this is merely a provisional step. We 
shall call for a joint conference attended by representatives of the 
local government, mass organizations, the armed forces and all 
parties and factions to elect a county government, and then unite 
many counties in order to organize a border area government. 
It will become a legitimate government by regulating all policies 
and making reports to neighboring provincial governments and 
to the Central Government. The [county] government's orga-
nization should generally be in accordance with the organization-
al laws promulgated by the Central Government. But under spe-
cial circumstances, partial changes of organizational methods 
are necessary. For instance, in a county government's organiza-
tion below the magistrate, besides the original administration, 
finance, education, and public security sections, there may be 
added sections in charge of the people's self-defense troops, food 
provisions, etc. In the district office, the number of assistants be-
low the district officer may be increased and their work function-
ally divided (administration, military affairs, finance, food provi-
sions, etc.). The organization of a township13 government is most 
important since it deals directly with the masses. In the organi-
zation of our North Shansi border area, we established below the 
township leader various kinds of committees, such as education, 
culture, food provisions, women, etc., none of which are sepa-
rated from production. Moreover, the paochia system may still 
be made use of to increase the government's strength and to main-
tain a close relationship with the masses. It is also necessary to 
establish organizations for the popular will.14 The best form is 
the assembly. At present, the Central Government has not yet 
prepared the organization of assemblies, but using the name of 
''consultative conferences"15 we have organized the people's rep-
resentatives for frequent conferences to discuss political ques-
tions. Every place in Shansi has a mobilization committee16 
which includes representatives of government, troops, labor 
unions, peasant associations, and the Sacrifice National Salvation 
League.17 We might expand the organization by increasing the 
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number of representatives and their units. It would thus become 
still more an organization representing the will of the people. 
There is another point to which special attention must be 
paid. All corrupt, rotten, and bureaucratic elements must be 
purged during the elections of responsible persons for govern-
ment. Elect only those who are upright, anti-Japanese, brave, 
capable, and trusted by the masses so that this government will 
be further cleansed and strengthened. 
2. Establishing a unified military command and a unified 
armed force. Establish a military area command in a guerrilla 
area (i.e., military area) to unify the actions of all troops. But the 
troops in such an area are extremely heterogeneous. For in-
stance in Shansi, there are the Eighth Route Army, the Eighth 
Route Army guerrillas, Central Army guerrillas, Commander-
in-Chief Yen's guerrillas, other guerrillas, anti-Japanese bandits, 
Red Spear Societies, Black Spear Societies, etc. Because they are 
so heterogeneous, they are under different commands. There-
fore, we should adopt some good methods to unify them. Our 
methods should be democratic and [lead to] voluntary rather 
than compulsory union. We are against that sort of compulsory 
unification and seizure and advocate a voluntary evolution from 
small guerrilla units to large guerrilla units to regular armies 
fighting unitedly Japan. 
We should adopt various attitudes toward bandits: (1) we 
should not be lenient but liquidate those who make trouble in 
or behind our base areas. (2) We should unite with those who 
have been active behind the Japanese lines. 
All troops should not only unite but should also create com-
petent guerrillas capable of fighting and carrying out government 
orders. All troops should receive legitimate commanders, and 
the commanding officers should be commissioned by the Central 
Government and the Military Affairs Committee. At present, 
there are in North China, besides the regulars, 100,000 guerril-
las most of whom are quite good. However, there is a relative 
lack of small arms, which we find difficult to obtain entirely from 
the Central Government. We should collect small arms 
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from the people and from the enemy to solve this problem. 
There are good ways to collect the people's small arms. 
There is a model guerrilla team in Shantung which very quickly 
collected 1,000 small arms. Their methods deserve considera-
tion: They [either] aroused18 people to bring with them their 
own small arms and join the guerrillas [or] they borrowed the 
people's small arms and issued certificates to them. It is hoped 
that you study these methods very carefully. 
3. Arming the people extensively. I recall someone asking a 
K'ang Ta schoolmate about the method of arming people, [but] 
this schoolmate of ours did not understand this method. This 
is an important problem, and it is hoped that you will study it 
intensively. We should arm the people, and the best way to do 
it is by organizing anti-Japanese people's self-defense corps. T h e 
Shansi mobilization committees have already promulgated an 
order pointing out the duties of people's self-defense corps such 
as assisting the army and guerrillas in battles, transmitting infor-
mation, patrolling, taking care of wounded soldiers, extirpating 
traitors, destroying the enemy's communications, and securing 
areas. The organizational method is for anyone between twenty-
eight and fifty years of age to be required to join the self-defense 
corps. The village is the basic unit and is divided into small 
teams (squads), medium teams (platoons), and large teams (com-
panies). The people should not leave production and use as 
arms guns, knives, hammers, and carrying poles; moreover, they 
should be equipped with stretchers and all kinds of road demoli-
tion tools. Such kind of self-defense corps organization has al-
ready been widely established in North China with every county 
having 40,000 to 50,000 men. County governments frequently 
have summoned cadres from every township and village for two 
months' training and then return them to work. The self-defense 
corps have started important activities in the war of resistance in 
North China. 
The National Government has already established able-bod-
ied troops19 in many places, but they have many defects. For 
example, able-bodied troops had the people give them food [and 
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they] levied taxes, beat, cursed, and so forth. Therefore, in 
places with able-bodied troops, we could change able-bodied 
troops into people's self-defense corps organizations, correct all 
defects the people dislike, and strengthen the organizations. The 
people's self-defense corps are the only way for mobilizing the 
people. Supplementing the [regular] troops will be easy once the 
people's self-defense corps are organized. 
4. Liquidating traitors, enemy spies, and bandits. We should 
punish [them] through the government and military administra-
tive organs. They should not be seized by the people haphazardly 
and shot to death. Forces for preserving order should be estab-
lished; existing militia20 and police may be reorganized, or peace 
preservation corps may be formed out of elements of people's 
self-defense corps. 
5. Starting up mass movements extensively and organizing 
the masses. First of all, there must be freedom of speech, press, 
association, and assembly. The government should maintain 
mass organizations, and organize peasant national salvation asso-
ciations. Workers should organize labor unions and merchants 
their merchant national salvation associations. These mass or-
ganizations should cooperate with the government, mobilize 
their members to assist the government by participating in all 
government work and joining the troops in battle. Moreover, 
the people's livelihood should be properly improved by reduc-
ing rent, taxes, and raising wages. All this is necessary to defend 
the members' personal benefits and hard work. 
In this manner anti-Japanese bases can be established! 
Now let's discuss some more of the policies of anti-Japanese 
base area governments! 
1. [We] will have [our] own financial plan. Our slogan is 
"money from those who have it, labor from those who can render 
it." 
First of all, all cruel taxes should be abolished. In the case of 
land, land taxes [and] commercial transit taxes may still be levied, 
but the method of taxation should be changed so that only the 
wealthy will be taxed and the poor be exempted. Also, contri-
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butions may still be collected but only on a voluntary basis. 
Compulsory contributions are absolutely prohibited, such as to 
label as traitors people who are unwilling to contribute more 
money than goods. During food shortages, food may be bor-
rowed by giving credit slips to the people for future compensa-
tion. In financial matters, all unnecessary waste should be 
prevented. Salaries of government employees should be all 
equalized. There shall be no pay for guerrillas. Give freedom to 
industry and commerce and raise industrial and agricultural pro-
duction [and] establish cooperatives. Circulate legal tender, but 
use puppet money where necessary. Boycott Japanese goods, but 
use them whenever we need some Japanese goods. Organize 
"Refugee Property Liquidation Committees"21 for taking care 
of the property belonging to all those landlords, capitalists, and 
merchants who have already run away. Until their return, use 
their lands and factories to raise production, and give them back 
after their return. 
2. Educational policy. Establish cadres training classes and 
adopt the same methods as those of K'ang Ta and Shen Kung.22 
Night schools, literary classes, and elementary schools may also 
be established. Education should be rich so that it can be geared 
to the needs of the war of resistance; such as anti-Japanese na-
tional salvation, theories, tactics, how to organize the masses, etc. 
3. External policy. We are against Japanese imperialism, 
not the Japanese people; therefore, we will continue to treat well 
Japanese prisoners of war. All British, American, and French 
citizens shall be protected. We will recognize the rights of self-
determination for the minorities (Moslems, Mongols, etc.), and 
unite with them to defeat Japanese imperialism. 
4. Internal policy. Liquidate traitors and consolidate the 
rear areas. Prohibit the growing and smoking of opium. Put in-
to practice the equality of the sexes and issue a marriage law, etc. 
In sum, the fundamental plan of all our policies is the United 
Front, to consolidate and expand the United Front and to solidi-
fy and motivate the great majority of the people to oppose Japa-
nese imperialism. 
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We shall make the anti-Japanese bases model areas for a na-
tion-wide United Front. The struggle for establishing anti-Japa-
nese bases is the struggle for establishing models for the United 
Front! 
5. How to carry out our work in areas under the enemy's 
puppet government control and in guerrilla areas? 
In places where the enemy's political power has already been 
established (such as Peiping, Tientsin, Shihchiachuang, T'ai-
yiian, East Hopei, etc.) and in guerrilla areas where neither our 
government nor the enemy's traitor government has been estab-
lished, our work plan is to destroy, disintegrate, and eradicate 
the traitors' government and troops so that the traitors' political 
power cannot be established. 
/ / / . Methods of Dealing With The Traitor Government 
If the traitors' government is already established in a place, 
our guerrillas must topple it, arrest and execute the traitors, and 
establish our Chinese anti-Japanese government. We shall at all 
times carry on our propaganda work in North China, oppose the 
traitors' government, and oppose the maintenance committees23 
organized by the enemy. The maintenance committees were or-
ganized after the retreat of the Chinese troops by the local upper 
crust.24 They have helped Japanese imperialism and have been 
miniatures of the traitors' political power. T o make the masses 
understand that the maintenance committees are traitors' orga-
nizations, [we] must call upon the people not to organize mainte-
nance committees [and to] reject the orders of the Japanese and of 
the maintenance committees. On the one hand, persons in charge 
of maintenance committees should be punished and the most 
rotten should be plucked out and executed. On the other hand, 
we should adopt a still more ingenious method to shake up and 
disintegrate the maintenance committees. According to our ex-
perience, not everybody in the maintenance committees is a 
traitor. Some of them have joined against their own will, [they] 
have been forced by the Japanese. They cannot help but make 
a display with the Japanese, but they still have not forgotten that 
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they are Chinese. In North China, some county magistrates and 
district chiefs quite frequently come to the Eighth Route Army 
areas reporting to us that they have been forced by the Japanese 
to convene maintenance committee meetings and seeking guid-
ance from the Eighth Route Army. One magistrate put it this 
way: "When you are here you can protect us, but after your de-
parture the Japanese will definitely kill me if I have been anti-
Japanese. So I have no choice but to make a display with the Jap-
anese. Please give us your guidance." In such a situation, would 
it be good if we opposed him, considered him a traitor and exe-
cuted him? I should say not. We can let him go, but tell him to 
return right after the meeting, and give us a detailed report on 
the meeting, the enemy's deceiving schemes, manpower, etc., so 
that we will further understand the enemy's situation. 
Moreover, someone in the vicinity of Peiping who had become 
a puppet county magistrate looked all over for the Eighth Route 
Army and the Communist Party and announced that he himself 
would not become a traitor, but [that he accepted the post of 
county magistrate only] for financial reasons. He added: "As long 
as you allow me to be county magistrate, you may organize at your 
discretion the masses for guerrilla warfare." This shows that 
there are also some wavering elements among the traitors. Again, 
for example, the Yin Ju-keng puppet organization in Eastern 
Hopei has been established for several years,25 but there are still 
very few vicious traitors in the puppet organization who firmly 
carry out Japanese orders [and] most cruelly slaughter the Chi-
nese. Most of the personnel's attitude is one of display, and thus 
our slogan "Chinese protect Chinese" is still effective. We have 
already done something like this. A man was picked up from a 
maintenance committee. We asked him whether he would be 
willing to become a traitor just to make a display with the Japa-
nese. He explained that he would be unwilling to become a 
traitor and to oppose the Chinese, but only to make a display 
with the Japanese. We believed him, gave him a commission cer-
tificate, and dispatched him to the Japanese side to collect infor-
mation. We made him sign and at this moment he could not but 
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sign in order to express his attitude. We then set him free and he 
has no longer dared to oppose the guerrillas. 
In the Northeast, Comrade Chao Shang-chih has sent out men 
to invite responsible persons26 of maintenance committees to 
come for a talk. They all declared themselves as Chinese. We 
then had recorded the names of father, grandfathers, and three 
generations, and made them [our] blood brothers.27 Henceforth, 
when our guerrillas need provisions, they can ask for their assis-
tance and they [i.e., the responsible persons of the maintenance 
committees] will not dare to help the Japanese actively. 
We can draw from these experiences the following conclu-
sions: Not everyone in the maintenance committees is an out-
and-out traitor [and] some of them are still wavering. Therefore, 
we should immediately and without hesitation execute traitors 
who act firmly as running dogs of the Japanese, oppose China, 
destroy the war of resistance, and collect information. But we 
can forgive and use those who waver and are still consciously 
Chinese. Our strategy is to decimate the traitors and not let the 
wavering elements all go to rely upon the Japanese [and] firmly 
become traitors. Therefore, we cannot adopt universally the 
method of execution. 
There is still another problem which demands attention. 
This kind of work must be carried out secretly, because if it were 
done publicly, first, the Japanese would execute the person as 
soon as they learn about [this liaison work] and second, the local 
people would begin to have doubts about us as soon as they learn 
about [it]. Only the Eighth Route Army and the Communist 
Party are qualified to talk with the maintenance committees in 
North China because the masses trust that the Eighth Route 
Army and the Communist Party are firmly anti-Japanese. Other 
friendly troops are not able to do so. The friendly troops of Sun 
Tien-ying once talked with the maintenance committees. The 
masses saw it and started rumors that Sun Tien-ying was going 
to surrender and was not to be relied upon. It took a long time 
to clear this up by explanation. 
This method, therefore, can be used only by those troops who 
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are the firmest, unwavering until death, and trusted by the 
masses. 
The method of dealing with the traitor troops: Japanese im-
perialism is attacking us by adopting its continuing scheme of 
"controlling Chinese by [using] Chinese." [The Japanese] have 
organized in North China anti-Communist autonomous troops. 
In many places these organizations have not materialized because 
often the troops ran away as soon as they had received their guns 
and money. Now the Japanese method is to engage Chinese in 
mess halls and transportation or to include several Chinese in a 
squad. What plans and methods should we adopt against such 
troops? Our plan is to disintegrate the traitor troops, win a part 
of them over to our side and together oppose Japanese imperial-
ism. Our method is to proclaim "Chinese do not fight Chinese/ ' 
"Chinese protect Chinese," "only fight Japanese troops, not au-
tonomous troops," [and] "only fight Japanese troops, not Mon-
gol troops." Propaganda [and] agitation using such slogans are 
beginning to show results. Besides, we do our best to avoid fight-
ing the puppet troops, and will not intentionally seek out puppet 
troops to fight them. But we, of course, resist if puppet troops 
attack us. 
There is an example in Shansi: At one time some puppet 
troops, dressed in Chinese army uniforms and disguised as Chi-
nese troops, approached the 115th Division of our Eighth Route 
Army. Our comrades, thinking that friendly troops were com-
ing, dispatched some men to establish contact. T h e enemy troops 
started shooting for half a day, and then we knew that they were 
the enemy. Subsequently, one of our little orderlies was cap-
tured by the puppet troops. They asked: "Why did you not 
open fire?" The little orderly answered: "We Chinese do not 
fight Chinese," whereupon they were greatly moved and released 
the little orderly. This shows that the Chinese among the puppet 
troops are also wavering. We should find a way to win them over, 
unite with the friendly troops, [and] together fight Japan. 
We should select and dispatch loyal comrades who are genu-
inely and firmly resisting Japan to penetrate and to be active in 
48 
the maintenance committees and autonomous troops, so that 
they can assist our troops [and] collapse [their] organizations. 
Many comrades are not happy about working in the mainte-
nance committees and puppet organizations but like to come to 
work in Yenan and the border areas. This, of course, is good, 
but [I] hope that [our] comrades can see the importance of work-
ing inside the maintenance committees and puppet troops. In 
the future, after your graduation, some [of you] will go to work 
in the maintenance committees and puppet troops. 
We will see to it that our guerrillas can get help not only from 
the people but also from the maintenance committees and pup-
pet troops. Only this kind of guerrilla can keep on fighting the 
Japanese over a long period. 
IV. Propaganda Work Toward Enemy Troops 
Propaganda work toward enemy troops is particularly im-
portant behind the enemy lines. We have not yet done nearly 
enough of this kind of work in North China. Not a single prop-
aganda slogan or notice is seen in places where the enemy is 
about to arrive. On the contrary, the enemy has written many, 
many slogan notices to deceive the masses, such as "The Imperial 
troops of Greater Japan are saving China," "Resisting Japan 
[means] destroying the country," "Loving Japan [means] to make 
the country prosper/ ' etc. Yet some comrades should not think 
that Japanese imperialism has adopted only savage measures in 
dealing with us, such as slaughtering, raping, etc. Actually, Jap-
anese imperialism has also used many, many deceiving policies, 
such as telling the Chinese: "The Chinese are very good, our Jap-
anese ancestors were also Chinese, same race same clan" [and] 
"Japanese are also devoted to Buddhism." [When they arrive] 
at a place, [they] call mass meetings, when they see children, they 
hypocritically carry them in their arms and give them candy, 
[they] give cigarettes to the middle-aged people, [and] sometimes 
[they] distribute some food among the people to take home, etc. 
Therefore, some of the masses have been deceived. In a walled 
village in northern Hopei, the people will not let our guerrillas 
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in, [and] the local bullies and landlords are saying: "[If] we do 
not oppose Japan, [we] can keep on living as honest common 
people, [but we] cannot survive if [we] oppose Japan." T h e 
enemy has burned and killed a lot in some places, but the traitors 
merely say: "This has been caused by the arrival of the Eighth 
Route Army and the Communist Party/ ' Comrades! We can see 
from this that the enemy's deceiving propaganda has been quite 
effective. Therefore, we must strengthen our propaganda work, 
give the masses detailed explanations, reveal all the enemy's de-
ceptions, [and] expose the enemy's crimes and animal-like con-
duct. We will also write notices and slogans in various languages 
(Japanese, Chinese, Mongolian, etc.), [and] expand our propa-
ganda work. Most recently, Japanese troops have surrendered 
with their guns to the Eighth Route Army. This has resulted 
from our good treatment of prisoners-of-war and the carrying 
out of propaganda work. 
V. The Mass Movement 
Starting up the mass movement is not a simple matter. We 
should decide the policy of our mass movement on the basis of 
local circumstances in North China, some in our rear, others in 
the enemy's rear. T h e anti-Japanese bases established by us have 
[both] guerrilla areas [and] enemy-controlled areas. In each dif-
ferent circumstance the masses' methods of work, organization 
and struggle are different. 
Now I shall report about the experiences of the mass move-
ment in Shansi: 
All of you know that General Yen Hsi-shan of Shansi is anti-
Japanese. Because he is anti-Japanese [he] needs help from the 
masses, [and he] needs to organize the masses, but at the same 
time [he] is afraid of having too many mass organizations. In this 
contradictory frame of mind of "wanting and fearing [the same 
thing]," he has organized a Sacrifice National Salvation League 
to develop mass resistance against Japan, but has also used this 
organization to limit the development of the masses, [and] has 
forbidden others to organize the masses. With regard to this 
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proposal, we have certainly advocated only the aspect of mobil-
izing the masses, and have also done our best in helping them, 
but we have not advocated the limiting aspect [and] have pointed 
out this defect to them. Consequently, although organized for 
a long time, the Sacrifice National Salvation League remains a 
paper organization,28 [and] a genuine mass movement has still 
not arisen. What is the reason? Not understanding the principle 
and method of organizing the masses. 
(1) Not understanding what to call the masses. 
We say that the majority of people [jen] are called masses 
[min chung], that the masses thus are people, that the particular 
feature of people is the ability to act and to think. Therefore, in 
order to organize them, [we] should make them organize them-
selves automatically, make the masses feel the necessity of orga-
nizing themselves. Without this point, you cannot organize no 
matter what.29 On the other hand, when the masses feel the ne-
cessity of organizing and are organizing, no matter how hard you 
[try to] stop [them], even beating [and] cursing them, they will 
still organize. For example, the Chinese Communist Party has 
been organizing while ignoring beatings and killings by others 
and has still developed. Again, for example, when Shansi troops 
arrived at a certain county, the masses all fled. The provincial 
governor was incensed when the troops reported to him by tele-
graph.30 The provincial government at once ordered the county 
magistrate to organize the masses within two weeks or else be be-
headed. Subsequently, despite threats and bribes, the masses re-
mained the same, not organized. Therefore, voluntary organiza-
tion by the masses is a most basic principle of the mass movement. 
(2) Not understanding that the masses have various different 
demands. Among the masses, there are various kinds of people 
(workers, peasants, merchants, small craftsmen, teachers, stu-
dents, etc.), and thus also various different demands. For orga-
nizing the masses, various methods and forms shall be applied 
based on the masses' various different demands. For instance, 
we will organize political parties for the masses who have 
political demands; organize economic units for [those] who have 
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economic demands, such as labor unions, peasant associations, 
etc.; organize study societies, libraries, singing teams, athletic 
clubs, etc., for [those] who have cultural demands. But the Shan-
si Sacrifice National Salvation League has not understood this 
point and has raised the one demand and method of national 
salvation through sacrifice in organizing the broad masses. T h e 
result has been no success at all. 
This is the defect in the creation and development of the mass 
movement in Shansi. Now, what we have been doing and what 
we have considered ought to be done in the anti-Japanese base 
areas are not like this but are the adoption of more suitable 
methods. 
a. Labor unions. 
1. Labor unions—Labor unions are organizations of the 
laboring masses. Whoever makes a living by selling his labor 
(either entirely or substantially), regardless of age, sex, or native 
place, may join a labor union. Union members should include 
production workers (factories, mines, etc.), employed handicraft 
workers (collectively employed, such as the mat makers of North 
Shansi, etc.), hired peasants (permanent work, temporary work, 
etc.), urban workers (sales clerks, waiters, etc.), elementary school 
teachers, low-ranking office employees. Some tenant-farmers31 in 
the villages have absolutely nothing; land, horses, tools, [and] 
seeds belong entirely to the landlords. They have only labor, 
[and] eighty per cent of the harvest goes to the landlords. These 
people may also join, because the twenty per cent of provisions 
they get is the same as wages. On the other hand, some peasants 
farm, but their principal income is from transporting by donkey 
or boat goods for others. These peasants may also join labor 
unions; [and] workers in Buddhist monasteries may also join 
labor unions. 
But beware of small handicraft workers, such as carpenters 
[and] owners of tailor shops, who cannot join labor unions be-
cause they sell their products and are not wage earners. They 
belong to the petit bourgeois class [and] may organize coopera-
tives or handicraft associations. Those who make their living by 
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disseminating religion, such as monks, Taoists, priests, fortune 
tellers, etc., and actors also may not join labor unions because 
they are not engaged in socially useful labor. 
Therefore, labor unions should not only absorb all wage 
earners, but also maintain themselves as workers' organizations. 
2. Organization. T o organize labor unions with production 
as the unit, a locality organizes a general labor union such as the 
Shen-Kan-Ning Border Area General Labor Union, embracing 
county labor unions, district labor unions, and village labor 
union branches. The village branch is the basic labor union or-
ganization. Within the village branch, all production depart-
ments, such as arsenals, coal mines, oil wells, etc., organize groups 
according to the members' occupations [and they] organize them 
into individual labor unions which accept directly the general 
labor unions' leadership. Within cities, they organize a labor 
union divided into branches according to the members' occupa-
tions. 
Labor unions at each level establish a leadership organization 
(committee) divided into branches for organization, propaganda, 
culture and education, labor protection, youth workers, women 
workers, etc. 
3. Demands. The important thing in the economy is to in-
crease the pay and to decrease the time [i.e., working hours], to 
demand vacations, labor insurance, compensation for injuries, 
illness, death, etc., and the particular demands of youth and 
women workers. Labor unions must protect and struggle for 
these demands. The political demands are resistance against 
Japan [and] national salvation. 
b. Peasant associations (or peasant national salvation associa-
tions). 
1. Membership—Anyone engaged in agricultural labor in 
the villages can join peasant associations. [They] include hired 
peasants, poor peasants, middle peasants [and] rich peasants 
(local bullies and landlords are not allowed to join). Besides all 
workers, teachers and students must join peasant associations. 
Why must all workers, teachers, and students join peasant asso-
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ciations? Because there are no cadres among the peasants [who] 
have to rely upon other people for leadership. Peasants often do 
their work under the direction of local bullies and landlords. 
Therefore, the aim of having workers, teachers, and students join 
peasant associations is to make [them] the leaders. They often do 
not understand much the life of peasants but, on the whole, much 
more than do the local bullies and landlords. Therefore, [when] 
workers, teachers, and students join peasant associations, the 
leadership power of the peasant associations will not fall into the 
hands of local bullies and landlords who are not resolutely anti-
Japanese. This is a question worth [our] attention. 
2. Organization. T o have a unified organization system (pro-
vincial, county, township, and village), leadership organizations 
at all levels establish committees divided into departments for 
organization, propaganda, culture, education, armed forces (self-
defense troops), etc. 
3. The general demands are rent reduction, tax-reduction, 
equal food distribution, water conservancy, establishment of co-
operatives, etc. 
c. Youth organizations (Children are to be attached to Youth 
organizations). [You] may organize Liberation Vanguard Teams, 
Youth Vanguard Teams, students, associations, youth national 
salvation associations, etc., in order to absorb all youth elements. 
There must be a complete organizational system from top to bot-
tom. [As to] the establishment of leadership offices at all levels, 
the main demands are for culture [and] education, young work-
ers, young peasants and young women. 
d. Women's National Salvation Organizations. All women 
should be absorbed. An organizational system from bottom to 
the top and leadership offices at all levels should be established. 
The principal demands are equality of the sexes, [i.e.,] equality 
in political, economic, cultural, educational, legal, and social 
positions. 
e. Merchants' National Salvation Associations. Existing mer-
chant associations may be reformed. With the aim of resisting 
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Japan and national salvation, the same organizational system and 
leadership offices should be established. 
In a village where the five above-mentioned organizations are 
established, the great majority of the people have joined the or-
ganizations and all can work quite well, we can say that the great 
majority of the people are organized [and] unite these five groups 
into a Resist-the-Enemy Rear Relief Association.32 In Shansi it 
is called Sacrifice National Salvation League. 
There is still another question, namely: Why raise these mass 
organizations? What are their duties? 
We say that during the present period of the war of resis-
tance, the duties of all mass groups are: to mobilize the largest 
majority of the masses to participate in the war of resistance [and] 
in all kinds of work in the war of resistance. If they are soldiers, 
to organize self-defense troops, guerrilla teams, to assist the troops 
in fighting, [and] cooking, to transport, to patrol, to sound 
alarms, to rescue wounded soldiers, to serve as scouts, to destroy 
roads, etc. 
But it is still not enough, if [we] merely mobilize the masses 
to participate in the war of resistance and neglect the livelihood 
of the masses. All these mass groups alike would collapse. There-
fore, improving the people's livelihood is also the duty of the 
mass groups. Only if the people's livelihood can be improved, 
can the greatest majority of the people be mobilized to partici-
pate in the war of resistance. This is a fixed principle. 
We should realize that during the war of resistance the peo-
ple's livelihood must be improved, but improving the people's 
livelihood must also be adapted to the war of resistance. [We] 
cannot let the masses' economic struggle become detrimental to 
the war of resistance. Tha t is to say that resisting Japan comes 
first [and] improving the people's livelihood comes second. So 
our principle is under the slogan of resisting Japan [and] within 
the sphere of not interfering with the United Front, do every-
thing possible to improve the people's livelihood. 
Is this not contradictory? Yes. The difficult place is right 
here. We may adopt this kind of method: do everything possible 
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to avoid using struggle methods, but adopt methods of discussion, 
negotiation and arbitration in order to fulfill the demand of im-
proving the people's livelihood. Is this method feasible? We say 
it is feasible [as] we have already had this kind of experience. 
The peasants in a place in Shansi raised demands for reduc-
ing rent to the landlords (at that time, the Japanese were just 
stepping up their attacks). The landlords said: The Japanese 
will soon come to attack. Whatever rent and loan payments you 
can make will be all right. This shows that not all landlords are 
stubborn and that negotiating33 is possible. 
There was also a county magistrate who, after receiving Com-
mander-in-Chief Yen's order to reduce rents, at once invited 
landlords and peasant association representatives to a party 
where the county magistrate pointed out the significance of the 
present war of resistance and the necessity for improving the 
peasants' harsh livelihood. [He expressed the] hope that the 
landlords would profoundly understand the great significance 
and voluntarily promise to reduce rents. As soon as the meeting 
was over, the county magistrate issued an order to give awards 
and to publicize the landlords' names throughout the county. In 
this manner the landlords were satisfied [and] the peasants' live-
lihood was improved. This is a very good method [and] we 
ought to study it. (Of course, there are also deadly stubborn land-
lords who disregard any kind of explanation; [then we] must 
take to armed struggle.) 
Moreover, when Chairman Chiang issued orders to punish 
severely corrupt officials, grave frictions between the people and 
government were discovered in Shansi, because not a single offi-
cial in Shansi was not corrupt. At this moment, the peasants, un-
der the favorable condition of "Chairman Chiang's orders at the 
top, the peasants' associations at the bottom," have called mass 
meetings to catch, liquidate, and execute corrupt village chiefs 
or district chiefs. But the village chiefs and district chiefs have 
tried to counter-attack and have complained to the county magis-
trates that the peasants' associations are organized by the Com-
munist Party or by traitors. As a result, the settling of accounts 
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has bogged down, and the great matter of resisting Japan and 
national salvation has been forgotten. This is a very bad phenom-
enon. We advocate not to settle old accounts, but all officials are 
no longer permitted to be corrupt. Severe punishment will be 
meted out against further corruption. Only in this way can the 
question be solved and friction between the people and govern-
ment be reduced. At the same time, a special office in the gov-
ernment should be established to negotiate and arbitrate all 
disputes, like the workers-farmers' sections or workers-farmers' 
bureaus in county governments. We must also cultivate and 
train a large number of cadres so that all mass groups for workers, 
peasants, youth, women, merchants have their own cadres as 
leaders. The stronger the ability of the cadres, the deeper the 
development of the mass movement, [and hence] a still larger 
force can be mobilized to participate in the holy war of resistance. 
Finally, in order to quickly organize and arm the masses, the 
method of "from top to bottom" has been adopted to establish 
mass organizations all over North China. [The method] is, first 
of all, to call several active elements for a preparatory meeting, 
to elect the preparatory committee members (provincial, county, 
or district), to proceed with preparations, training, and distribut-
ing cadres among all villages to establish organization. Within 
a proper time, a representative assembly would be called to for-
mally establish the organization. These coordinated methods 
which are from top to bottom and from bottom to top may be 
adopted in the present war of resistance. 
By working according to the above-mentioned methods, we 
will be able to have the largest majority of the masses organized, 
mobilized, [and] enthusiastically participating in all types of 
work in the war of resistance. 
FOOTNOTES 
1 Abbreviation of K'ang-Jih Chuncheng Tahsiieh—Anti-Japanese Military-Political 
College. 
2 Marco Polo Bridge. 
3 XXXX in this and the next sentence probably stands for Chiang Weiyiianchang 
—Chairman [of the military affairs committee] Chiang. Yen refers to Yen Hsi-shan, 
governor of Shansi and Commander of the Second War Zone (North China). 
4 Mintsu homing tahsiieh. 
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5 Shansi ch'ingnien k'ang-Jih chiiehssu tui. 
6 ch'ihchiu; literally: enduring. 
7 ch'iinchung; literally: masses. 
8 chiit'i ti ts'ailiao; literally: concrete materials. 
9 The line runs the entire length of Shansi from Tat 'ung in the north to P'uchou 
(Yungchi) in the south. 
10 Chin-Ch'a-Chi piench'iX linshih weiyiianhui. 
11 Chin-Ch'a-Chi piench'iX tang-chiin-cheng-min linshih taipiao tahui. 
12 Liu is in error; Paoting is not east of the line but on the line (see map). 
13 hsiang. 
14 minyi chikuan. 
15 ts'anyi hui. 
16 tungyiian weiyiianhui. 
17 Hsisheng chiukuo t'ungmeng. 
18 kutung. 
19 chuangting tui. 
20 mint'uan. 
21 Nanmin ts'aich'an ch'ingli weiyiianhui. 
22 Shen-pei Kung-hsHeh—North Shensi Public School. For a brief description, see 
Kuo Hua-lun, "Chungkung shucheng ch'ien-hou," Fei-ch'ing Yiiehpao, April 1968, 106; 
translated in Warren Kuo, "The CCP Pledge of Allegiance to the Kuomintang (Part 
I)," Issues and Studies, August 1968, 42. 
^weich'ih hui. 
24 haoshen. 
25 General Yin Ju-keng was installed by the Japanese as the head of the East Hopei 
Autonomous Government on November 24, 1935. 
26 futse jen. The Chinese Communists use this term frequently. They usually trans-
late it into "responsible person," by which they mean a leading member of an organiza-
tion. See the latest translations in Wai-wen kanpu hsiiehhsiao (comp.), Han-Ying 
shihshih yung yii-ts'e hui (Peking: Hsin-Hua Shutien, 1964), 120. 
27 hsiungti. 
28 k'ung chiatzu. 
29 wulun tsen yang. 
30 or telephone; orig.: tien kao. 
31 tien nung. 








Chin-Ch'a-Chi piench'u linshih weiyuanhui 
Chin-Ch'a-Chi piench'u tang-chun-cheng-min 
linshih taipiao tahui 




ch'uankuo taipiao tahui 
Chuchang kungtao t'uan 
ch' linchung 
Chunghua minkuo k'aikuo wu-shih nien 
wenhsien pientsuan weiyuanhui 
chut'i ti ts'ailiao 
futse jen 
hao shen 




K'ang-Jih chuncheng tahsueh 
K'ang-ti hou yuan hui 
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mintsu chiehfang hsienfeng tui 
Mintsu koming tahsueh 
mint'uan 
minyi chikuan 
Ming-jen chiangyen chi 
Nanmin ts'aich'an ch1ingli weiyuanhui 
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wulun tsen yang 
Yen Hsi-shan 
Yin Ju-keng 
yu ch' ien ch'u ch ' ien, yu l i ch'u l i 
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